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I. AN EVER-DECLINING PROFESSION

The spectre of commercialism has haunted large law firms since their rise
at the end of the nineteenth century. At the turn of the century there was
already a sense that the profession had compromised its integrity and, by too
close embrace of business, its identity. In 1895 a New York legal newspaper 1
complained:
[The bar] has allowed itself to lose, in large measure, the lofty independence, the genuine learning, the fine sense of professional dignity and

We elaborate on many of the observations and ideas set forth here in MARc GALANTER
& THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE GROWTH AND TRANSFORMATION OF
THE LARGE LAW FIRM (1991).
" Evjue-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School. B.A. 1950,
M.A. 1954, J.D. 1956, University of Chicago.
""Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School. B.A. 1975, Tufts University;
J.D. 1981, Ph.D. 1981, University of Pennsylvania.
1. American Lawyer (not the intense monthly that has since 1979 chronicled (and cheered
on) rapid change in the world of large law firms, but a long-extinct legal newspaper of the
same name, published in New York from 1893 to 1908).
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honor ....

[Flor the past thirty years it has become increasingly

contaminated with the spirit of commerce which looks
primarily to the
2

financial value and recompense of every undertaking.

A dozen years later, New York attorney John Dos Passos delivered a similar
indictment: "From 'Attorneys and Counselors at Law' they became agents,
solicitors, practical promoters, and commercial operators. .

..

Entering the

offices of some of the law firms in a metropolitan city, one imagines that he
is in a commercial counting-room, or banking department. " 3 Deploring the
commercialization of the profession he reported:
It may also be safely said that the prevailing popular idea of the lawyer,
too often justified by facts, is, that his profession consists in thwarting the
law instead of enforcing it ....
The public no longer calls them "great"
but "successful" lawyers ....
It is the common belief, inside and outside

of the profession, that the most brilliant and learned of the lawyers are
employed to defeat or strangle justice.4
By the 1930s, when the large firm was firmly established as the standard
vehicle for delivery of the most complex legal services, its scale and stability
were recognized in the pejorative phrase "law factory.' Describing the bar
in 1933, Karl Llewellyn focused on the emergence of "a key phenomenon-the
'law factory'. . . [in which] the mass of the work is done by the ablest young
men from the best law schools, while the product goes out under the name and
over the name of three senior partners." 6 Corporate practice had become
"itself a business. .

.

. [with] a large staff, a highly organized office, a high

overhead, more intense specialization."' Large firms attracted the "ablest of
legal technicians"' but fostered a "lopsided" business perspective that ignored
the wider public functions of the bar. 9
The "factory" metaphor caught not only the instrumentalism, but the

2. The Commercializing of the Profession,3 AM. LAW. 84 (1895).
3. JOHN R. Dos PAssos, THE AMERICAN LAWYER: As HE WAs-As HE IS-A HE CAN

BE 46 (1907).
4. Id. at 130-31.
5. This term was used by Karl Llewellyn in a 1931 book review. See K.N. Llewellyn, A
Lawyer Tells the Truth, 31 COLUM. L. REv. 1215, 1218 (1931) (book review).
6. K.N. Llewellyn, The Bar Specializes-With What Results?, 167 ANNALS AM. AcAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 177, 177 (1933) (footnote omitted). Llewellyn was careful to add,
however: "The ablest, i.e., of those who are deemed personable and socially unobjectionable.
There is a caste tradition to be maintained, or at least not to be 'unduly' diluted." Id. at 177
n.3.

7. Id. at 177.
8. Id.

9. Id. at 179.
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systematization, the division of labor, and the coordination of effort introduced
° Commentators also felt that the metaphor expressed
by the large firm.W
something about those firms that was profoundly at odds with professional
traditions of autonomy and public service. What bothered critics was not
efficiency, but what they viewed as the total commercialization associated with
it. In one of the first academic treatments of the large firm, Professor A. A.
Berle, Jr., in the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, saw the abandonment
of the notion that "a lawyer was an officer of the court and therefore an
integral part of the scheme of justice"" and its replacement by a notion of
the lawyer as "paid servant of his client."" Berle further wrote: "The
complete commercialization of the American bar has stripped it of any social
functions it might have performed for individuals without wealth.""1
This grim assessment was shared by Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone,
who described "[t]he successful lawyer of our day ... [as] the proprietor or
general manager of a new type of factory, whose legal product is increasingly
the result of mass production methods."' 4 Stone deplored the commercialization and deprofessionalization of the big-firm lawyer:
More and more the amount of his income is the measure of professional
success. More and more he must look for his rewards to the material
satisfactions derived from profits as from a successfully conducted
business, rather than to the intangible and indubitably more durable
satisfactions which are to be found in a professional service more
consciously directed toward the advancement of the public interest....
[The changed system] has made the learned profession of an earlier day the
obsequious servant of business, and tainted it with the morals and manners
of the marketplace in its most anti-social manifestations.'"

10. Some commentators found further parallels, attributing to large firms the standardization, "robotization," and monotony thought characteristic of factories. In 1939, muckraking
journalist Ferdinand Lundberg entitled the last of his series of Harper'sMonthly Magazine
articles on lawyers The Law Factories:Brains of the Status Quo. In that article, Lundberg
explained: "The term 'law factories,' widely used in the legal profession, may be derisive, but
it is accurate. The great law firms are organized on factory principles and grind out standardized legal advice, documents, and services as systematically as General Motors turns out
automobiles." Ferdinand Lundberg, The Law Factories: Brains of the Status Quo, 179
HARPER'S MONTHLY MAG. 180, 180 (1939).
11. A.A. Berle, Jr., Modem Legal Profession, in 9 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 340, 343 (Edwin R.A. Seligman et al. eds., 1933).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 343-44.
14. Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, Address at the Dedication of the
University of Michigan Law Quadrangle (June 15, 1934), in 48 HARv. L. REv. 1, 6 (1934).
15. Id. at 6-7.
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Even circa 1960-a time of prosperity, stable relations with clients, steady
but manageable growth, and a comfortable assumption that this kind of law
practice was a permanent fixture of American life and would go on forever'-inhabitants and observers regarded the big-firm world as sadly declined
from an earlier day in which lawyers were statesmen and served as the
conscience of business. For example, when Erwin Smigel, the pioneering
student of Wall Street firms, interviewed lawyers in the late 1950s, law firm
partners complained to him that the practice of law was turning into a
business.17 And Martin Mayer, another observer of the world of large firms,
reflected in 1956 that young associates no longer regarded themselves as
servants of the law and holders of a public trust. Mayer wrote: "[T]hey are
too busy fitting themselves for existence in the 1950s, when efficiency,
accuracy, and intelligence are the only values to be sought.""8
Contemporary misgivings about the commercialization of law practice are
part of a long tradition of lamentation over the decline from the virtuous
professionalism of an earlier day. 19 That earlier era of virtuous professionalism always seems to lie just over the horizon of personal experience. It is
easy to imagine the occupants of the big-firm world of the year 2020 deploring
its decline from the integrity and professionalism of the 1990s.
I.

THE ASCENDANCY OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM

Will there be big law firms in the 2020s? The large law firm is a success
story: there are more of them, they are bigger, and they command a bigger
share of an expanding legal market. Even the downturn of the 1990s has not
substantially damaged their relative standing as suppliers of legal services.
Indeed, they may be gaining market share at the expense of the in-house
sector. That success, and the reasons behind it, make the large law firm a

16. For other strata of the profession, however, there was a sense of decline from a more
prosperous past. In 1959 the American Bar Association's Special Committee on Economics
of Law Practice complained that lawyers' incomes had fallen relative to those of doctors and
dentists. The Committee saw the legal profession as "endangered by the creeping instability
of its economic status" and "dwindling" as the percentage of national income spent on legal
services fell to one-third of what it had been at its all-time high in the early Depression years.
Part of the Committee's solution was minimum fee schedules to be enforced by the profession's disciplinary bodies. See SPECIAL COMMrrEE ON ECONOMICS OF LAW PRACTICE,
AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, LAWYERS' ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND SOME BAR ASSOCIATION
SOLUTIONS (1959).
17. See ERWIN 0. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER: PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION
MAN? 304-06 (ist Midland Book ed. 1969).

18. Martin Mayer, Keepers of the Business Conscience: The Wall Street Lawyers, Part1I,
HARPER'S MAG., Feb. 1956, at 50, 56.
19. For more on the "declension thesis," see generally Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. Rv.1, 48-68 (1988).
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strong contender to be the predominant organizational form for delivering legal
services in the future.
The big law firm has grown and prospered because it solves two
problems, one external and one internal. First, the large law firm is a proven
success externally as a social form for organizing the delivery of comprehensive, continuous, high-quality legal services, especially to businesses. In the
late nineteenth-century United States it appeared that the in-house corporate
lawyer would come to dominate the world of business lawyering, but this trend
proved short-lived.' Like the hospital as a way to practice medicine, the big
firm has provided the standard format for delivering complex legal services.
Even as the big firm is criticized, features of its style-specialization,
teamwork, continuous monitoring on behalf of clients, representation in many
forums-have been emulated in other vehicles for delivering legal services.
The specialized boutique firm, the public-interest law firm, the corporate law
department-all model themselves on a style of practice developed in the large
firm. And legal professions around the world have increasingly emulated the
American big firm, especially in the breadth of its legal services. No other
legal enterprise has proven as capable of providing as many complex legal
services to as broad a clientele. The large law firm offers clients "one-stop"
expertise and an internal, "bonded" referral market. Clients with multifaceted
problems are able to address those problems with the help of a single entity.2"
That is the large firm's external success story. Second, and as important,
though less well understood, is the big firm's internal success story. The large
law firm has grown and prospered because it has provided an appropriate
structure of incentives to facilitate delivery of the complex legal services
demanded by clients. Because this second aspect of the large law firm is less
well understood, it is perhaps worth briefly retelling the story of the basic
transaction that underlies the large law firm.
For convenience we begin our tale with a lawyer, call her P, who has
more shareable human capital 2 than she can use by herself. P wants to

20. One observer of law firm history has concluded that corporate legal business gravitated
to outside firms, not law departments, because "[t]he additional experience and connections
that were developed by serving a variety of clients made the value of law firms so high that it
was economically infeasible, in a short-run time horizon, for corporations to 'buy out'
corporate law firms, or to establish equivalent in-house legal departments." Thomas P.
Pinansky, The Emergence of Law Firms in the American Legal Profession, 9 U. ARK. LirLE
ROCK L. REV. 593, 634 (1986-87).
21. General Motors, for example, has recently ended its attempt to foster price competition
among law firms and has switched back to using fewer law firms. Ellen J. Pollock, General
Motors Is Dismissing 450 Law Firms, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 1993, at Bi.
22. By "shareable human capital" we refer to four types of assets: (1) a lawyer's pre-lawschool endowment of intelligence, skills, general education, and the like; (2) her investment in
her legal education and experience-dependent skills; (3) her professional reputation; and (4)
client relationships.
Published by Scholar Commons, 1993
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increase her income by "renting" her surplus assets to other attorneys. In
attempting to do so, P faces two types of problems. On the one hand, like any
landlord, she worries that she might not get the rented assets back or that they
might be returned damaged. In particular, following Gilson and Mnookin,"
we argue that P will fear that a renter, call him A, might "grab" her clients,
"leave" before P has a chance to recover her expenditures on A's training and
capital acquisition, or "shirk" by failing to produce promised levels of output
or investment. On the other hand, P must also confront the reality that no
renter ever fully trusts his landlord. A will have substantial concerns which
must be set to rest before he will put forward maximum effort. For instance,
A may fear that P will not compensate him fairly for his contributions to the
firm since she has incentives to undervalue his work and because he cannot
verify her evaluation of his efforts. Consequently, A may be disinclined to
provide more than a minimal performance for P regardless of what he has
promised: that is, he will shirk.
To protect her capital P must, in part, construct an incentive scheme that
induces maximum effort from A. To provide the necessary assurances and
incentives for maximum effort, we argue that the big law firm has typically
employed what we call the "promotion-to-partner tournament." The stylized
rules of the tournament are simple. Over a fixed period of time, the firm
holds a contest in which all the A's, call them associates, in a particular
"entering class" compete, with the prize of partnership being awarded to some
fixed percentage of the "top" contestants. An associate's final standing in the
tournament depends upon the size and quality of his production of two goods:
(1) high-quality legal work; and (2) his own human capital, measured
subjectively, not mechanistically. After a specified period of time, the players
in a particular class are ranked, and the top few percent are declared "winners." The losers either are told that they can remain employees but will
never become partners or are fired and given consolation prizes, such as
severance pay or help finding another job, or nothing.
The tournament provides the assurances and incentives required by both
parties to the deal. The associate now has an incentive to produce the
maximum combination of legal work and human capital because he can rely
on the firm to award promotions on the basis of productivity and performance.
By conveying through past practice that, on average, a fixed percentage of the
associates will be promoted after a period of time, the firm has obligated itself
to distribute a fixed amount of compensation to the winners of the tournament.
Regardless of who wins the tournamentthe firm must pay out the same prizes.
This is essential to the firm's compensation scheme because it communicates
to each associate that it is in the firm's own interest to award the prize of

23. See Ronald I. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Coming ofAge in a CorporateLaw Firm:
The Economics of Associate CareerPatterns, 41 STAN. L. REv. 567, 573 (1989).
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partnership to those who have produced the largest combined bundle of output,
quality, and capital. To award the prize on other grounds would saddle the
firm with less productive attorneys at no savings in prize money. Moreover,
the associate can verify that the firm is paying out the agreed prizes by
observing how preceding classes fare. So long as the firm intends to continue
recruiting new associates, current associates are safe in assuming that the firm
will continue to adhere to the implicit contract rather than risk the adverse
reputational and motivational effects associated with breaching. Associates can
be confident that productivity will be rewarded, while shirking will not be, and
so long as the expected prize is competitive with the realistic alternatives,
associates will exert maximum effort to win the contest. By inducing
maximum effort from the associates, the tournament also alleviates the
partners' fear of shirking.
However, the promotion-to-partner tournament, which is originally
instituted as a mutual monitoring device, contains a hidden but significant byproduct. As we demonstrate in our book, if a firm holds a tournament where
a fixed percentage of associates is promoted each year, a firm will grow
exponentially as long as the associate-to-partner ratio does not decrea~e.
This is because as the designated percentage are promoted, the firm must not
only replace them but must also hire enough additionalassociates to keep the
associate-to-partnerratiofrom falling so that there are associates available to
continue utilizing all of the partnership's shareable assets. So long as the
number of promotions exceeds the number of departures from the partnership,
each promotion to partner will lead to net increases in both the number of
partners and the number of associates at the firm. Because the promotion
percentage is constant and the associate-to-partner ratio is constant or
increasing, the firm's percentage growth rate will be constant (exponential) or
increasing (faster than exponential). This is important because a firm that
grows exponentially will eventually exhibit large jumps in membership. Our
argument, therefore, is that what appear to have been sudden spurts in law
firm size were, in significant part, the product of a long-term historical process
begun on the day the firm institutionalized its promotion-to-partner tournament.
Nothing in our account precludes firms from occasionally changing their
growth rates. But firms need to take care that in changing their growth rates
they do not unintentionally alter the basic structure of their tournaments. To
do so is to risk serious incentive problems in motivating their associates.
As we suggest above and discuss at length elsewhere, we believe that a
firm will tend to promote only those associates who have at least as much
human capital as the average partner and that the firm will set its promotion

24. See GALANTER &

PALAY,

supra note *, at 102-08.
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rates to, on average, meet this target.' But there is no reason that associateto-partner ratios cannot fall, especially in an economic downturn, if the value
of the firm's human capital diminishes.
Of course, there are costs to reducing associate-to-partner ratios, and
firms have borne some of these costs during the recent economic downturn.
On one hand, partners may make less money or have to work harder to
maintain a given standard of living. On the other hand, a firm might attempt
to maintain a constant associate-to-partner ratio and attempt to reduce growth
by reducing the percentage of associates that become partners. A sudden
substantial decrease in a firm's promotion rate will change its growth rate. It
will also effectively reduce the compensation package that the firm offers its
entering class. In an economic downturn in which many firms are similarly
affected, the reduced compensation may have minimal impact on the firm's
ability to recruit. Even if the firm's compensation package suffers by
comparison to its competitors' and it experiences recruitment difficulties, that
need not portend a dramatic shift in the structure of the firm, so long as the
new promotion rate remains fairly stable. We believe that the firm faces a
dramatic transformation if it fails to maintain a constant promotion rate (even
at the new, lower levels), for it is then effectively abandoning the tournament.
Our point is that any organizational alternative to the large law firm must
provide the same incentives and protections offered by that enterprise and its
tournament. If you want our first best guess of what the law firm of tomorrow
will look like, observe carefully the law firm of today.
III. ALTERNATIVE FUTURES
It is conceivable that what lies ahead for large law firms may be very
different from the course they have followed for almost a century. We make
no claim that the future course of legal practice is fated and known to us. We
foresee a period of fluidity and experimentation, and what will emerge from
such a period remains unknown and unknowable. But, taking off from
existing forms-some old and some innovative-and from current trends, we
would like to speculate about the near future of the big firm and its variants,
companions, and rivals in the corporate hemisphere.
A. BiggerFirms
1. The "LaterBig Firm"
We call the first set of options the "Later Big Firm." Later Big Firms
will share a tendency toward market orientation, rationalization of incentives,

25. See id. at 105-06.
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and accentuated hierarchy. In such firms the "promotion-to-partnership" core
will be reduced in relation to the total mass of the firm by some of the host of
devices for slowing the effects of the promotion-to-partner tournament: twotier hiring, permanent associates, paralegals, technology, contracting out, and
a general stretching out of the time required to reach partner. 6 There will
be various levels of partnership, and partners' performance will be continually
evaluated. The tournament, already pervasive for associates and of some
import for partners, will be greatly extended and intensified during the
partnership phase. Partnership will become less of a plenary and permanent
reward, thus necessitating the design of additional incentives for performance
and loyalty. Some of this can already be seen in the winnowing of less
productive partners by some firms.27
2. The "Big Six Firm"
A variant of the Later Big Firm is suggested by the observation that the
coverage-driven push toward greater size, more locations, and greater range
of services might lead to giant national or international firms that bear some
resemblance to the "Big Six" accounting firms in size, structure, and market
concentration. But to fully mimic the Big Six, a law firm will have to further
modify its traditional promotion-to-partnership core. The Big Six are
generally characterized by taller hierarchies and considerably higher associateto-partner ratios than the traditional big law firms. For example, in 1989
Arthur Andersen & Co., one of the Big Six, had 40,136 professional
personnel, of whom 2,405 (6.0%) were partners.'
Thus, in addition to
using more bureaucratic systems of control, the law firm that attempts to
evolve in the direction of the Big Six will need to increase its ratio of
associates to partners and reduce the rate at which associates are made
partners.
We are skeptical that big law firms will eventually look like the Big Six
accounting firms. First, the big law firms must travel a considerable distance
before their market shares are anywhere near the size of a Big Six firm's. The
legal-services market is still remarkably unconcentrated compared to the
markets for other professional services for businesses. Moreover, conflict-ofinterest problems might set more restrictive upper bounds on law firm size.29

26. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note *,at 62-66. Compare Steven Brill, The Law
Business in the Year 2000, AM. LAW., June 1989, at 5, in which Brill foresees the emergence
of firms that liberate themselves from the "growth inertia trap" of "exponential growth
generated from the supply side" and learn to conform growth to increases in demand.
27. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note *,at 67-68 & nn.188-93.
28. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note *,at 122. The highest partner ratio among the Big
Six was 11% in 1989. Id. at 122 n.3.
29. Professor Susan Martyn's paper written for this conference addresses this problem.
Published by Scholar Commons, 1993
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We also remain skeptical of the Big Six option for the very reason that the
big accounting firm is premised upon a relatively high associate-to-partner
ratio. Law firms that attempt to emulate this model would be required to
increase their associate-to-partner ratios and to reduce their promotion rates.
On one hand this would reduce the expected value of being an associate.
Therefore, the firm would have to pay a premium either by providing greater
compensation to associates up front or by increasing the value of a partnership.
A failure to adjust associate salaries or partnership value would result in a
reduction in total compensation. On the other hand, as we argued above, the
number of associates per partner a firm can afford is related directly to the
amount of per-partner human capital possessed by the firm and the constraints
on the firm's ability to monitor associates. To increase the associate-to-partner
ratio, the firm would have to dramatically increase the value of its human
capital per partner. We are unable to see where that increased value will
come from. In addition, costs of monitoring also limit associate-to-partner
ratios. Nothing indicates that firms have so substantially overcome the
difficulties in monitoring associates as to allow them to significantly increase
these ratios.
To say that law firms will not take the Big Six path is not to say that the
Big Six might not enter the market for supplying corporate legal services.
Due to their very substantial resources, their large legal departments, and their
enormous networks of clients, one can easily imagine a scenario in which large
accounting firms compete directly with large law firms in providing businessrelated legal advice. Much of the debate about law firm diversification is
couched in terms of law firms incorporating other sorts of professionals. It
seems improbable that the boundaries between the professions would be
relaxed in one direction only. As law firms increasingly offer services that
depart from the traditional legal-services norm, they will face competition
from other business advisors like accounting firms, management consultants,
and investment bankers, who will include legal services in their multidisciplinary packages. As the bar relaxes its claims that lawyers cannot share control
of their work and firms with nonlawyers, it will find it more difficult to
maintain that an entity that provides legal services must be devoted exclusively
to producing legal services and must remain under the overall control of
lawyers.
3. The "MultidisciplinaryFirm"
Of course, the multidisciplinary trend will run in both directions. Not
only do we expect accountants and other professionals to offer legal services,

See Susan R. Martyn, Visions of the EternalLaw Firm: The Future of Law Firm Screens, 45
S.C. L. P1Ev. 937 (1994).
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but we anticipate that, more so than today, the Later Big Firm will stress a
multidisciplinary, or "diversified," law practice. A firm oriented in this
direction will incorporate other types of professionals and will supplement its
legal services with management consulting, investment counseling, lobbying,
and the like. We have noted elsewhere the move of some aggressive law firms
into such arrangements already.3" One commentator foresees that law firms
will become diversified service firms deploying teams drawn from many disciplines, "more oriented to problem-solving than traditional law firms."3 1 A
similar evolution is already occurring in accounting firms, where the
accounting-and-auditing core represents a decreasing portion of the firms'
work, and consulting services an increasing portion.32
Is the multidisciplinary thrust another device for adding employees outside
the partner/associate core? Or is it a device for changing the character of that
core by including nonlawyers within it? So far most hiring of nonlawyer
specialists has been in subsidiaries33 or on an ad hoe lateral basis. Bar rules
forbidding partnerships with nonlawyers" have obviated the promotion
question. But the recent authorization of nonlawyer partners in the District of
Columbia portends an erosion of such barriers.35 We can imagine a world
in which such nonlawyer workers are commonplace and in which some
nonlawyers are invited to join law-firm partnerships. Firms will have to hire
either senior people who have developed their expertise elsewhere or junior
people who will develop their skills under the supervision of seniors.36 Will

30. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note *, at 66-67.
31. James F. Fitzpatrick, Legal Future Shock: The Role ofLarge Law Firms by the End of
the Century, 64 IND. L.J. 461, 465 (1989).
32. For instance, accounting and audit fell from 66% of Arthur Andersen's revenue in
1975 to 49% in 1985. Larry E. Rittenberg, The Public Accounting Profession: An Overview
of Its Structure, Its Products, and Its Concerns (Nov. 23, 1987) (unpublished memorandum on
file with authors).
33. The same argument from professional symmetry arises in coanection with subsidiaries:
If law firms can own nonlaw subsidiaries, can't nonlawyers have a law subsidiary? Corporations are allowed to have legal departments that fill their needs for legal services. Why can
they not supply legal services to their customers?
34. See generally Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does the One
Who Has the Gold Really Make the Rules?, 40 HAsTINGs L.J. 577, 584-99 (1989).
35. On Mar. 1, 1990, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals adopted a rule that
permits partnerships for nonlawyers who are involved exclusively with helping lawyers to
provide legal services. See Neil A. Lewis, Non-Lawyers to Be Partnersin Firms in Nation's
Capital,N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 2, 1990, at B8; Randall Samborn, Non-Lawyers as Firm Partners,
NAT'L L.J., Mar. 8, 1990, at 1. Because, under the rule, nonlawyers may now be partners
only in firms whose sole purpose is to provide legal services to clients, law firms will
continue to use subsidiaries to provide services that cannot readily be characterized as "legal
services."
36. Some juniors might be hired to remain supervised staff. Presumably, however, some
junior hires would be talented people with the potential to develop their own human capital.
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such junior nonlawyers be hired on the associate's "promotion to partner" deal
or on some other basis? How will a firm provide incentives to induce people
to work hard and to develop their human capital in such specific "multidisciplinary" forms? How can the work of these nonlawyers be monitored?
Because the problems of monitoring and motivating other professionals are
quite similar to the problems of monitoring and motivating lawyers, it is likely
that these problems will be solved by "tournaments" not unlike those used by
current law firms. Will the nonlawyers participate in the same tournament as
lawyer associates? Or will firms organize parallel tournaments similar to the
separate tenure competitions in neighboring departments in universities?
So long as such nonlawyers are rare, relatively immobile, and hired on
individualized deals, their presence may enlarge profits for partners without
any threat of expanding the partnership. But when the inclusion of nonlawyers
becomes commonplace, and they therefore have opportunities for lateral
movement, there will be pressure on firms to reward the nonlawyers at levels
sufficient to retain them. The most accomplished professionals are not likely
to be content to remain in a subordinate tier. So even if the multidisciplinary
model seems tempting as a device to shrink (relatively) the promotion-topartner tournament, we would expect its widespread and extended use to
require the enlargement or duplication of the core promotion tournament. In
other words, even if diversification succeeds in shrinking the proportion of
lawyers competing for ownership interests, the number of professionals
involved in one promotion tournament or another is unlikely to decrease
substantially as a proportion of the total firm size.
B. Modified Firms
Another set of alternatives retain the specialization, rationalization, and
marketing themes of the Later Big Firm but either abandon hierarchy,
coverage, and size or modify the Later Big Firm's relatively uniform structure
of rewards.
1. Boutiques
The term "boutique" has come to refer to highly specialized small firms
residing in the corporate "hemisphere.""' These firms cultivate their
comparative advantages in selected specialties and suppress any push to more
general coverage in order to maintain their attractiveness for referral work

37. See Gail Appleson, Boutique Firms Hold Their Own, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 7, 1983, at 1;
Marcia Coyle, Boutique Shakeout: Merger Can Be an Attractive Option, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 2,
1987, at 1; Jan Schaffer, Cost-Cutting Legal Boutiques Tailor Services to Clients, PHIL.
INQUMER, Nov. 16, 1981, at 613;
Thirteen Great Small Firms, AM. LAW., Apr. 1981, at 27.
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from big firms.3" Despite their small size, such firms compete with big firms
for lawyers. Typically, though, their ratios of associates to partners are lower
than those of big firms.
Though commentators are not always careful to do so, it is important to
distinguish the boutique from the incipient big law firm.39 The boutique
combines small size, intense lawyer and firm specialization, and a commitment
to remain small.' The incipient big firm may contain the first two elements
but never the last. Unlike partners in big firms, where a major part of the
partners' return is from renting capital to associates, it appears that partners
in boutiques increase their income by using associates and other resources to
maximize return on the sale of their own time.41 But recognizing the
differences between the large law firm and the boutique simply raises a host
of yet-unanswered questions.
For instance, what incentives do high-quality young attorneys have for
joining and remaining with a boutique? Certainly the boutique must pay well.
But presumably the boutique pays some of the compensation in the "currency"
of collegiality, absence of the competitive pressure of the tournament, the
opportunity to work with senior attorneys as a protege, and so forth. The
close personal relationships, increased loyalty, and desire for regard from
seniors provide boutiques with the control over shirking that is provided by the
tournament in the big law firm. But such a compensation scheme raises still
more questions. If all the compensation is paid up front, what incentives are
there for the associate to remain with the firm once he has learned all he can
from the present partners? Will the young lawyer find it undiminishingly
rewarding to be the protege of a senior attorney? If an associate who masters
the skills of the partners is promoted, how does the firm remain small? If that
associate is replaced, can the top of the pyramid grow without the bottom
growing? If associates typically leave and build their own specialized
practices, how will the boutique maintain its comparative advantage and the

38. The market for highly specialized services is in large part a referral market, and
referral is encouraged where the referring firm has no fear that the referee firm can compete
with it for general representation of the client.
39. It is also important to distinguish it from other kinds of firms that remain small
because they have no shareable human capital. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note *, at
109-110.
40. From the point of view of associates, a branch of a large firm may have appealing
boutique-like qualities of small size and personal relations combined with a large-firm
credential, less travel, and more transfer possibilities that may facilitate moves for a twocareer family.
41. As one not necessarily typical boutique manager put it: "[W]e have got to make our
profit off making more money on a case per hour .... Contingent fee work primarily. That
is what allows us to get sufficient profit so we don't have to add a bunch of associates on who
[sic] we are leveraging and making money." Steven Susman, Remarks at American Lawyer
Eighties Shakeout Conference (June 1, 1987), transcript at 133 (transcript on file with author).
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correspondingly high fees it previously commanded? Just how big can a
specialized firm get? Are the services the boutique provides inherently
different from those of the big firm? Is there a commitment to confine income
gains to those that can be had by cultivating comparative advantages and
specialization rather than by increasing the base of the pyramid? Is this a
viable strategy given that specializations fall as well as rise in favor?42 These

are all questions which must be confronted by any lawyer contemplating a
boutique practice. That these questions do not have easy answers explains in
part why the true boutique is observed only relatively rarely. Will the
boutique form become widespread? We tend to doubt it, but the boutique is
likely to continue to occupy an important niche as a supplier of legal services
to the business and legal communities.
2. Mixed Compensation, or "Lifestyle, "Firms
By the "mixed compensation"43 firm we refer to firms in which there is
a commitment to reduce the traditional big firm's heavy dependence on
monetary compensation and instead to facilitate a mixture of pecuniary and
nonpecuniary rewards such as child-rearing leaves, flextime, part-time work,
sabbaticals, and time for political or pro bono work." The lawyers in such

42. See, e.g., David Ranii, Specialized Bars Strive to Survive, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 14, 1981,
at 1 (describing the attrition of various administrative law specialties in the era of deregulation).
43. Of course, compensation in the strictest sense is almost always "mixed" and includes
not only cash, but also implicit values such as satisfaction, personal fulfillment, prestige, and
the like. We want to distinguish here those firms in which the value placed on the nonmonetary elements of the package is no longer implicit and is not assumed to be the same for all
members of the firm.
44. The term "lifestyle" has emerged as a descriptive tag referring to the whole collection
of preferences for other sorts of fulfillment over more income (and the work satisfaction
associated with obtaining it.) See, e.g., Brill, supra note 26, at 24 ("The real questions the
new technology raises have to do with life-style and employment opportunity."); Terry
Carter, Students Grill PotentialBosses: What is Life Really Like There, NAT'L L.J., June 19,
1989, at 4 ("Stanford Law School's placement office recently sent a questionnaire... with a
laundry list on lifestyle issues."); Terry Carter, Now, a Novel Twist on Flex-Time: NALP
ChiefMoves to California, NAT'L L.J., July 3, 1989, at 4 ("After several years of spotlighting the wishes of newly minted lawyers for lifestyle benefits from employers, NALP has
made a major lifestyle concession of its own: Executive Director Jamienne S. Studley is
moving from the association's Washington, D.C., office to follow her husband to San
Francisco, and she will still be executive director of the D.C.-based NALP."). We use the
more cumbrous "mixed compensation" tag because the term "lifestyle" is difficult to separate
from connotations of self-indulgent consumption. In particular, "lifestyle" suggests an
equation of parental responsibilities with very different kinds of preferences. We do not
assert that these preferences are of equal value; neither do we assert that they are entirely
distinct. One might, for example, imagine distinct "parenting" and "other" types of mixedcompensation firms. But we doubt that such types would remain distinct, since parenting
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firms are willing to take returns in the form of these amenities in lieu of
higher cash income. Attorneys in such a firm might emphasize integrating
work and family responsibilities by means of child care, flextime, and the
"electronic cottage." Or they might be eager to take their returns in terms of
less hierarchy on the job, greater involvement in political movements, or other
"communal" forms. In its various versions, the mixed-compensation firm
represents an attempt to harmonize professional work with other valued aspects
of life.
Among the hundreds of big firms there are some that aspire to maximize
not only the monetary rewards, but also the total fulfillment, of their lawyers.
Informal inquiries several years ago generated a list of half a dozen such
firms. But the feat has proven peculiarly difficult to pull off.
Prominent among "lifestyle" firms is Holland and Hart, one of Denver's
"big four" firms. Founded in 1947, Holland and Hart is recognizably a
traditional big law firm, organized around the promotion-to-partner tournament
and responsive to the pressures of the market: it has brought in several small
firms by merger; it has eight branches; and it pays its lawyers "a businessgetting reward of 10 percent of the fees they bring in the door."' At the
same time, however, the firm has institutionalized an unusual degree of
egalitarianism in titles, offices, votes, and personal relations; a heavy
commitment to pro bono work (five to twenty percent of each lawyer's time);
periodic sabbaticals; and other human-enrichment policies.' As cynics might
anticipate, paradise is not without some murmurs of dissension. As a senior
partner observed: "The bottom-line movement gained momentum.... The
collegial aspect has fallen off and emphasis on productivity and profits has

gained. "47
Is it foreordained that the party of the bottom line will prevail? Our
expectation that firms will keep growing if they can rests on the assumption
that partners prefer not to decrease income. Are we saying that they are
single-mindedly determined to have more cash? Not necessarily, only that
they want "more." But why not take rewards in other forms? Why do bigfirm lawyers insist on taking the gains of firm growth in the form of more
money income rather than sabbaticals, time for child-care, political involvement, or greater work satisfaction? Presumably some lawyers would trade the
next increment in cash for an increment of one of these other benefits. Why
is this only dimly reflected in the way large firms are organized? Instead,
most large firms are organized as if everyone were trying to maximize take-

responsibilities tend to be concentrated during the first half of lawyers' tenures with their
firms.
45. Rita H. Jensen, Seeking a Balance, NAT'L L.J., July 18, 1988, at 1, 22.
46. See id. at 1, 22.
47. Id. at 23.
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home income. Since firms have successfully created internal markets for their
human capital, why it is apparently so much more difficult for them to create
a companion internal market in amenities?
We believe that there are at least two problems which lead firms to
emphasize monetary rewards above all else. First, there is the transaction-cost
problem of attempting to value the nonmonetary benefits. Money is not all
that partners want. But securing and monitoring agreement about the priority,
value, and mix of "goods" attorneys want as their returns from practice
becomes ever more complex as a firm grows. Since "money" is high, even
if not first, on everyone's scale, it is almost always easier to get agreement on
more money than on any competing benefit. And as firms get larger,
agreement becomes even more difficult. This is especially so when firms, as
they grow, become more diverse in terms of gender, ethnicity, class origins,
and educational backgrounds-and when lateral hiring and mergers reduce
opportunities for differences to be smoothed out by early socialization in the
firm culture. The problem of getting firm personnel to agree that they would
all prefer a specific competing benefit to more money becomes insurmountable. So most big firms fall back on money as the medium of exchange which
can be used as a second-best solution, a summation of the diverse priorities of
the members. Reputation and prestige, insofar as they are instrumental to
securing more money, are also relatively susceptible to agreement.
Our transaction cost/governance argument about the increasing difficulty
of agreement on nonmonetary forms of reward as firms grow is reinforced by
changes in the market for attorneys. The ready availability of lateral
movement permits the partner who wants money instead of, say, sabbaticals,
to leave if her partners insist on the latter. A concentration of partners who
want sabbaticals or more independence can overcome problems of pluralistic
ignorance and negotiate the package they want. But then those who prefer
money can leave and go elsewhere, with disruptive effects. Hence, even if
they are in the majority, and even if they know it, the mixed-rewards partners
are not likely to impose their will. 48 "Mixed-rewards dissidents," in
contrast, are not as mobile since they would have to find new firms that have
schedules of rewards that approximate their own desires. Such firms are rare
and usually small, and their reward schedules are not readily known. So the
transaction costs of such a move for mixed-rewards dissidents are very high.
Second, mixed-compensation firms tend to emphasize monetary rewards
because even firms with a significant concentration of lawyers seeking
nonmonetary compensation must face the problem of assuring those who
receive alternative forms of payment that they are not being exploited. The

48. Instances of successful consensus seem to rely heavily on strong leadership, embodied
in firm "tradition" and selective recruitment. How enduring this proves in the large-firm
setting remains to be seen.
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problem stems in part from the suspicion of those receiving mixed-compensation packages that they are not being fully compensated for the value they add
to the firm. Whether true or not, the perception exists. Perhaps the
perception originates in the sense that the market for those willing to sell their
services for alternative compensation is more limited than for those willing to
work for traditional pay. The concern is that an attorney, once he has
declared his preference to receive mixed compensation, is no longer fully
mobile and has no less costly alternative than to sell his services to his existing
firm. Consequently, he believes that his firm gains monopsonistic49 power
over his services and has the ability to extract a rent from him when he
attempts buy back his time for alternative pursuits or obligations. This leads
to feelings of vulnerability, exploitation, and exposure to additional pressures.
C. Analogues of the Large Firm
Next, we come to some options that pursue the benefits of size-visibility,
economies of scale and scope, and capacity to take on large matters-not by
enlarging firms but by creating linkages between them.
1. Networks or Affiliation Groups
Smaller firms may seek to obtain the benefits of the big firm by linking
themselves to other firms to share clients or training facilities or information
about management, practice development strategies, tactics, support services,
and experts for litigation. In many respects the linkage of smaller firms is an
extension or accentuation of the big-firm structure, which is in a sense a
network of working groups, departments, and regional offices. Some big
firms-the Cravath firm, for example-are tightly integrated, with a relatively
small partnership and no branch offices. But with the small-firm networks,
coordination is accomplished without formal integration. Thus the work of a
number of law firms in a set of related matters might be supported and
coordinated without creating an elaborate internal organization. The practices
of in-house legal departments or outside firms serving as national litigation
coordinators-in the defense of a particular product, for example-can produce
such networks without formal organizations. Such a coordinator may select
local counsel, provide technical backup, and set litigation policy with an eye
to maximizing the integrity of the product.5 0 By "affiliation groups,"
49. A monopsonist is the demand-side equivalent to a monopolist. Like the monopolist,
who is the single supplier of a particular output, a monopsonist is the only consumer of some
good or service.
50. See Myra Alperson, Asbestos Defendants Begin To Cooperate in Litigation, LEGAL
TIMEs, Sept. 19, 1983, at 3 (a New York firm serving as national counsel to one asbestos
manufacturer set up a document center and devised a two-way communication system to
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however, we refer to a variety of organizational forms that are more inclusive
and less integrated than the conventional law firm, yet more integrated than
these ad hoc support arrangements. Some of these groups are regional; some
national and international. Some are electronic networks with little organizational superstructure; others have separate headquarters and staff." They
share the aspiration to achieve some of the advantages of pooling capital while
retaining local autonomy and avoiding the governance problems that follow
mergers.52 Although affiliation groups pool human capital, the sharing is
interfirm, not intrafirm. This represents a form of pooling different from the
partner/associate deal that is at the heart of the of the big law firm. Such an
arrangement obviates the need for a tournament within the affiliation group,
but not the need for a parallel tournaments within the component firms.53
2. Subcontracting
Extra-firm collaboration need not be prearranged or continuing. Firms
might enlarge their capacity by subcontracting to other lawyers or firms. 54
For example, the NationalLaw Journalreported that Seattle firms involved in
the massive Washington Public Power Supply System securities litigation
"[were] tending to use contract lawyers rather than letting themselves balloon
with the extra business."55 Firms may have a strategy of seeking very large
matters and meeting staffing needs by contracting with smaller firms. A
dynamic Houston firm of some thirty lawyers was thus able to take on the
massive Hunt Brothers litigation: "[W]e go to small firms around the country
and ... we pick the lawyers we want to work on the case .... It's great for
referrals in the future. It assures that we aren't going to have to expand too
quickly . . .. 11 Subcontracting strategies are facilitated by the growth of
coordinate the activities of counsel in 40 different jurisdictions); Irene Warshauer, Litigation
Management Techniques, ALTERNATrIVE HIGH CosT LiTG., Nov. 1984, at 7 (attorney-incharge describing the role of this kind of coordinating counsel).
51. See Rita H. Jensen, Networking: The Future of Law Firms?, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 7,
1988, at 1.
52. The appearance of such networks invites the question of whether we might expect to
find the related but distinct two-level solution of franchising, in which the parties contract for
an exchange of capital in a standardized form. One might imagine a national law firm
exchanging its brand name and package of tested procedures for a smaller firm's local
reputation and client contacts. Some law firm branching may already approximate this.
53. Each of the member firms may be built around such a tournament, but the interfirm
tournaments are not integrated but remain parallel. We might imagine scenarios of disintegration in which a firm decomposes its tournament into several parallel ones-for example, for
separate departments, regional offices, or nonlawyer professional groups.
54. See James S. Granelli, Hiring Out: Boon for Small Firm, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 6, 1978,
at 1.
55. Gail D. Cox, Fees Keep Comingfor Seattle Bar, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 13, 1987, at 1, 34.
56. Steven Susman, Remarks at American Lawyer Eighties Shakeout Conference (June 1,
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firms supplying temporary legal workers, both lawyers and paralegals.57
Outside suppliers also provide firms with litigation support services that not
only include computerized document retrieval but can extend to "taking over
case management, tracing the whereabouts of defendants and witnesses,
writing briefs and researching issues, providing expert witnesses and making
visual presentations for trial.""8 Firms can use these services to achieve
enlarged capacity while avoiding a commitment to growth that might be
unsustainable.
D. Nonfirm Alternatives
Finally in our list of alternatives, we should consider providers of
business-law services who have not chosen the law firm as a vehicle for
organizing these services.
Corporate law departments, for example, have grown rapidly at the same
time that there are more and larger law firms. There are now groups of
salaried lawyers, in corporations, governments, and other organizations, who
are undertaking more and more of the range of matters traditionally handled
by big law firms. In some instances this means displacing the large law firm;
in other instances it means enhancing control over outside law firms.
Corporate departments may model themselves on the big firm 9 or adopt
organizational structures that depart sharply from that of the big firm.60
In-house law departments are very different creatures that deserve more
detailed analysis. They do not enjoy the autonomy of free-standing firms;
their size is linked to the needs of a single client; the prosperity of senior
members is not connected to the number of junior members. To incorporate
the promotion-to-partner tournament as an incentive, the department would
have to be able to sustain growth independently of the needs of its corporation.

1987), transcript at 129-30 (transcript on file with author). Farming out work has always
been a part of the big firm repertoire. What seems to be new is its elaboration as an
alternative way of being a contender for the most profitable legal work.
57. See Barbara Berkman, Temporarily Yours: Associatesfor Hire, AM. LAW., Mar. 1988,
at 24; Laura Mansnerus, Law Firms, Too, Hire Lawyers by the Hour, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,
1988, at B10.
58. Martha Middleton, Getting Support, NAT'L L.J., June 4, 1984, at 1, 26. The recent
growth of contract research services is recounted in Arthur S. Hayes, Lawyers Hire Ghostwriters, Raising Specter of Liability, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 1989, at B1.
59. General Foods' attempt to organize its law department as a firm with associates,
promotion-to-partner tournaments, and collegial governance is described in MARK STEVENS,
POWER OF ATTORNEY: THE RISE OF THE GIANT LAW FIRMs 80-94 (1987).
60. See Carl D. Liggio, Remarks at the Federal Bar Council 1984 Bench and Bar
Conference, Dorado, Puerto Rico (Jan. 29- Feb. 5, 1984), transcript at 107 (transcript on file
with author) (General Counsel of Arthur Young and Co. describing his office of nine lawyers
and sixty support staff).
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One possibility is to de-link the department from company needs by selling
excess capacity to other companies,6 or to employees or small businesses,
or even to outside law firms. One can imagine a firm that is a "law
subsidiary," rather than a law department, of a corporation. The development
of such a firm would of course confront the long-standing ban on the practice
of law by corporations. 62
E. Profession-Wide Structural Changes
All of the formats discussed here leave undisturbed the basic architectural
features of the system of legal services. 63 One of these is the division of the
profession into what Heinz and Laumann call the individual and corporate
hemispheres.' Specialization, they point out, is as much by client as by field
of law.A Could the separation of hemispheres be overcome? Perhaps.
Imagine, for example, a pool of personal-injury or labor lawyers serving
clients on either side by the "cab rank" principle.6 This in turn would
involve a retreat from the strong identification with the client that has been
such a distinctive characteristic of American lawyering. We might also
imagine that legal services were provided as a public utility rather than in a
competitive marketplace. 67 This would give an unaccustomed primacy to the

61. See id. (describing how a corporate law department that developed expertise in the
unitary tax area was retained by other corporate law departments).
62. See Andrews, supra note 34.
63. One of these architectural features is that all legal services to all kinds of clients are
provided by members of a single, albeit highly differentiated and stratified, licensed profession. We suspect that in spite of intensified specialization and stratification, ideological and
political considerations will keep "law" a single profession. In a 1921 Carnegie Foundation
report that many hoped would be the Flexner Report of legal education, Alfred Z. Reed
proposed the formation of "[a]n Inner Bar distinguished from the General Body of Practitioners," ALFRED Z. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW 237 (1921), to
include "lawyers of superior attainments, of broader vision, of greater ability to identify
themselves with a larger whole than is possible for relatively untrained minds ... [and] less
highly trained lawyers to administer, in behalf of the people, the law as it is." Id. at 238.
This aspect of the report received a frigid reception and was never acted upon. We see
nothing in the present situation that suggests any new support for the notion of separate
training and licensing of an elite cadre of lawyers.
64. See JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 319 (1982).
65. See id. at 324-25. For a more elaborate account of patterns of lawyer specialization,
see LYNN M. LOPUCKI, THE DE FACTO PATrERN OF LAWYER SPECIALIZATION (1990).
66. The "cab rank" rule is an English Bar rule that obligates a barrister to accept the next

client in line and to argue that client's position, whatever it may be. Gordon, supra note 19,
at 83 n.61.
67. For example, Marvin Frankel has proposed a National Legal Service that would set up
"government law offices comprising salaried lawyers who would be available to serve all

citizens, rich or poor, for every species of legal problems." Marvin E. Frankel, An Immodest
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theme of lawyers as public officers.
We mention these more far-reaching proposals to put in perspective the
new forms of practice that we discuss here, which leave in place the basic
architecture of the system. Although nothing is more common than the
occurrence of changes unanticipated by social observers, we confess that we
see on the horizon nothing that would change the commitment to a lightly
regulated, decentralized, private market for legal services involving intense
lawyer-client ties.
IV. FINAL THOUGHTS
Many of the problems faced by big firms originate in the discomfort of
the attorneys who must deal with the increasing pressures of growth. But that
growth cannot be controlled in isolation. Much of it is a by-product of the
very mechanism which allows lawyers to efficiently exchange their assets. So
long as business attorneys have a need to share capital and labor, there will be
a demand for some mechanism to protect against the risks inherent in the
exchange. The large law firm's promotion-to-partner tournament has played
an integral part in safeguarding the interests of the parties to this exchange.
Growth, fortunately or unfortunately, has been a by-product of that device.
We can imagine an impulse to address the problems of big firms through
public regulation. Various proposals can be conjectured: control of firm size,
control of hierarchy within the firm, or the elimination of firms altogether.
But we are skeptical of the need for and efficacy of such reforms and believe
that most such attempts misconstrue the nature of the big firm's problem.
Attempts to limit by fiat the size, organization, or growth of firms, without
also addressing the risks inherent in the underlying transaction, endanger the
exchanges which allow skilled lawyers to address more issues and service
more clients. Regulating growth might also jeopardize the very exchanges
which permit young lawyers to develop the skills, experience, and reputation
to assist large clients with increasingly large and complex problems.
We suspect that reforms that focus only on the structure of firms without
also addressing how to safeguard the underlying exchanges would do little to
alleviate the problems of commercialization that trouble big-firm lawyers. We
believe that the big firm has provided useful means of dealing with the
monitoring and incentive-compatibility problems associated with sharing
human capital. Will it always? Not necessarily. But lawyers are neither
unintelligent nor selfless. If it is possible to more efficiently organize the
exchange of human capital without firms, enterprising lawyers are likely to do
so and thereby gain a competitive edge over those who are slow to respond.
But until that time, efforts to "break up" law firms will not eliminate the need
Proposal,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1977, § 6, at 92, 100; see also Marvin E. Frankel, Proposal:
A NationalLegal Service, 45 S.C. L. REv. 887 (1994).
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to share human capital but will impose greater transaction costs on doing so.
If intervention in firm organization is justified, it is not to make lawyers
comfortable but because firm organization affects the kind, quantity, quality,
cost, or distribution of legal services. If, for example, we knew that the
growth and transformation of business-law firms reduced the availability of
legal services, or made them more expensive or decreased their quality, we
would have cause for concern. In making such assessments, we should not be
interested only with the way that firm organization affects the large firms'
business clients. We should be equally concerned about firm organization's
effects on wider constituencies. Does the growth of big firms increase the
disparity in quality and quantity of legal services afforded to large corporations
as compared to their smaller antagonists, or to representatives of diffuse and
unorganized interests, or to public agencies? How do the changes in the
market for legal talent brought about by growth in the number and size of
large firms affect the supply of legal services for others? And how do
increases in the size, competitiveness, and hierarchy of large firms affect the
lawyers' independence in giving advice, their firmness in holding clients to
legal or moral standards, their participation in legal reform, and so forth?
Little research addresses these questions. What research there is suggests
that disparities in the quality of representation have shrunk, not grown, in the
recent past. It also suggests that lawyers have in the past displayed fewer
noble attributes than we might have hoped.6" That recent growth in the scale
of law firms has decreased the production of public benefits by lawyers is far
from clear. We think these are questions that deserve exploration. If the
public intervenes in law firm organization, it should be with an eye to
protecting public interests, not lawyer comfort levels. And any such
intervention will have to keep in mind the way in which the law firm is a
solution to a tricky set of problems that flow from the very nature of the
lawyer's craft.
As we survey the big firm of today, its variants, companions, and rivals,
we may be seeing prefigurations of emergent forms of practice, or we may be
looking at sports and chimeras. What forms will prosper depends on unknown
contingencies, among them the still emergent preferences of lawyers.
Nevertheless, we want to close with a few speculations about the general
contours of things to come.
The present era of transformation is reminiscent of the formative era of
big firms. The big firm arose in the late nineteenth century from lawyers'
participation in the restructuring (by consolidations, mergers, and reorganizations) and financing of business organizations and from handling the litigation
that swirled around them in a legal setting of unprecedented complexity.

68. See, e.g., ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOcIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FiRm 231-69 (1988).
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Lawyers and clients were mobile; firm arrangements were fluid and volatile.
The new kind of law firm that crystallized provided services that ranged far
beyond what had earlier been considered the boundaries of the practice of
law. 9 Today, we are in another era of business restructuring, the complexity
of which is compounded by transnational flows of capital and new information
technologies. As the demand for legal services changes, with more complex
deals and greater use of litigation as a business strategy, there is an expansion
of services provided by lawyers. We see a volatility and organizational
innovation that have been absent from the legal scene for generations.
As we talk about changes, we should recall the considerable stability of the
world of big firms. Big law firms are still relatively small units; they have
relatively small shares of their market; they are relatively unbureaucratic; they
are dependent on particular kinds of clients; and they are constrained
somewhat by an ideology of professionalism. These continuities coexist with
powerful and enduring currents of change. We do not anticipate a reversal of
the trend to rationalization; we expect that by cost accounting, specialized
managers, and other means, firms will be more self-consciously strategic in
their management and planning. We also anticipate that law firms will be
increasingly entrepreneurial, oriented to finding new markets for their services
and developing new services (including new combinations of "legal" and
"nonlegal" services) and new forms of firm organization. Up to now there
has been basically one model of the big firm with minor variations. 0 Later
Big Firms are coming to look less alike as they try different strategies for
coping. We anticipate pluralization-both in that big firms will be less similar
and that some of the work they presently do will be done by firms (or
nonfirms) that are not big firms at all.
But little suggests that the great promotion-to-partner tournament is on the
wane. Nothing has reduced the need of both partners and associates for
protection from opportunistic conduct. Partners still require a method of
motivating and monitoring associates, and associates continue to need
assurances that hard work will be truthfully evaluated and rewarded. The
promotion-to-partner tournament solves both problems. We can imagine firms
having increasingly elaborate tournaments, and we see evidence of that in the
tiering of partnerships and in the firing of some associates earlier than in the
past. We can see the reduction of the promotion-to-partnership core relative
to the entire mass of the firm, but we find no evidence that the core is not
going to continue to grow. This does not mean that every firm will keep

69. See Pinansky, supra note 20, at 623.

70. For more on the tendency of organizations in a field to resemble each other, and the
forces that support such isomorphism, see generally Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell,
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growing inexorably. Firms may break apart-but we expect that the successor
pieces would then recommence the pattern of exponential growth. We can
also imagine a downward trend in which the portion of growth due to demand
would decrease so that overall growth would be slower, possibly even
resulting in changes in promotion rates. There may be major discontinuities,
but the inherent difficulties of monitoring the sharing of lawyers' human
capital suggests that the changes will be of degree, not of kind. We believe
that the coming changes, like the changes that have already occurred, will be
designed to supplement the tournament, not to replace it.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss5/9

24

